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MPEG-DASH is a video streaming standard that outlines protocols for sending audio and
video content from a server to a client over HTTP. The standard has been widely utilized
by the video streaming industry. However, it creates an opportunity for an adversary to
invade users’ privacy. While a user is watching a video, information is leaked in the form
of meta-data, the size and time that the server sent data to the user. This information is
not protected by encryption and can be used to create a fingerprint for a video. Once
the fingerprint is created, the adversary can use this to identify whether a target user is
watching the corresponding video. Successful attack schemes have been proposed based on
this leakage of user data using both Machine Learning (ML) and algorithmic approaches.
Only one defense strategy has been proposed to deal with this problem: using differential
privacy that adds a sufficient amount of noise in order to muddle the attacks. However, this
strategy still suffers from the trade-off between the privacy level and efficiency for both the
server and the client. To break through the problem, this paper proposes two schemes. A
server-side defense and a client-side defense against the attacks with rigorous privacy and
performance constraints, creating a totally private, scalable solution that outperforms the
extant schemes. Our two proposed schemes, No Data are Alone (NDA) and a proposed
scheme that uses only a single cluster (Single Cluster Solution), are developed based on K-
Means clustering and are highly efficient. The experimental results show that our schemes
are more than two times as efficient, in terms of excess downloaded video (represented as
waste), than the most efficient differential privacy-based scheme. Additionally, no classifier
can achieve an accuracy above 7.07% against videos obfuscated with our scheme NDA and
2.5% against our Single Cluster Solution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Server to client video streaming is commonly encrypted and is characterized by a series
of requests from client to server, and subsequent fulfillment of these requests from server
to client. Popular online streaming services, such as YouTube, Netflix, etc., all share the
industry standard MPEG-DASH, a protocol for server to client video streaming over HTTP.
Chosen ubiquitously in the industry for its high performance, in spite of the widespread use
of cryptography today, the standard has a weakness: it can be exploited by a side channel
attack, allowing for an adversary to compromise user privacy by determining whether or
not a user is streaming any video chosen by the adversary. With YouTube being used for
both recreation and as an educational hub, there are many things a user might not want
to be exposed. It is possible for an adversary to steal sensitive information about a user’s
health, personal relationships, possessions, or future actions, including, for example, how
to make a house appear occupied while on vacation.
One of the components of MPEG-DASH that allows it to become an effective attack
surface is the reliance on variable bit-rate encoding (VBR). Bit-rate is the measure of bits
per second being sent across a system, in the case of video streaming it is the amount of bits
needed to encode one second of video that is sent from server to client. This number of bits
can be fixed, Constant Bit-rate Encoding (CBR), or vary depending on the content to be
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sent. VBR is a double-edged sword. It allows for efficient use of storage and high quality
streaming, but also allows a unique fingerprint to be made for a video. VBR only sends as
many bits as needed to render each segment of video, making it far less wasteful than CBR
and is the reason it is widely used instead of CBR. In a video encoded by VBR, a high
action scene will require more bits and have a relatively higher bit-rate, and a lower action
scene a lower bit-rate. MPEG-DASH breaks videos into time segments of approximately
the same length (Sodagar, 2011), and a client will only request a new video segment when
its buffer falls below the threshold. Thus, a client creates uniquely sized bursts of traffic
over time, which can be used as a fingerprint for a video. Researchers have created various
attack models based on this information (Schuster, Shmatikov, & Tromer, 2017; Gu, Wang,
Yu, & Shen, 2019; Reed & Klimkowski, 2016; Dubin, Dvir, Pele, & Hadar, 2017).
The most effective of these attacks is by Schuster et al. (Schuster et al., 2017), its
effectiveness is due to the fact that it makes no closed world assumptions, has high accuracy,
and because it can be executed by JavaScript code (e.g., in the form of a malicious web
browser advertisement). This attack relies on a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
that is trained on the meta-data of the target video to be identified, and other video bit-rate
measurements are used for negative examples. The adversary measures video stream bursts
by saturating the network connection between the client and the server and then estimating
the change in congestion; a form of timing side channel attack used against schedulers
(Kadloor, Kiyavash, & Venkitasubramaniam, 2016). This saturation allows the adversary
to learn the victims traffic pattern, and consequently, the video burst pattern. This attack
was used to great effect, and the YouTube video classifier from the paper had 98.8% recall
and 0 false positives (Schuster et al., 2017).
The defense to these attacks is straightforward in principle, but its implementation re-
quires careful consideration because of the potential computational overhead. To stop the
bit-rate streaming pattern from being able to be identified by an adversary, the streaming
pattern must be obfuscated. To the best of our knowledge, the only defense algorithm was
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proposed by Zhang et al. (Zhang, Hamm, Reiter, & Zhang, 2019). This paper focused
on defending against the CNN attack model mentioned above (Schuster et al., 2017). The
work done in this paper uses differential privacy, specifically d∗− privacy (Xiao, Reiter,
& Zhang, 2015), which is adjusted for time series data, and the Fourier Perturbation Al-
gorithm (FPAk) which was proposed by Rastogi et al. (Rastogi & Nath, 2010). The goal
of the defense is to create an obfuscated bit-rate pattern with differential privacy and then
use a proxy in the form of a browser extension to send segment requests based on this dif-
ferentially private pattern. These methods were able to successfully reduce the accuracy of
the CNN model below 50%, but incurred waste in the form of extra downloaded material,
or ran a deficit by not downloading enough material. Differential privacy always trades
a lack of utility in exchange for privacy, in this case, the waste incurred by this solution
is a hindrance when watching video streams, especially on already computationally weak
mobile devices.
In light of the computational constraints of many users, and seeking to find a bit-rate
request pattern that was not random, but efficient, we pursued K-Means clustering. The
centroid of a cluster in K-Means clustering would provide us with an average of all videos
in that cluster, and so this pattern would be representative of many videos, so it can be
used to obfuscate efficiently by replacing a video with its centroid pattern. Sometimes a
cluster may only have one data point (video), making the cluster’s centroid equal to the
video in the cluster. Obfuscation with this centroid would provide no privacy. Because of
this, K-Means cannot be used without augmentation.
Our proposed server-side defense scheme and our client-side defense schemes are an
augmented version of K-Means, and they cluster videos based on bit-rate over time. We
then use the cluster centroids as the new pattern for video requests to be sent, creating an
efficient request pattern. Our privacy is shown through experimentation and through a for-
mal privacy definition. We recreate the CNN video classifier (Schuster et al., 2017) to show
our scheme’s effectiveness. In addition to the experimentation done to show our scheme’s
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privacy, we give a formal privacy definition and a formal distance privacy definition that
is based in the L1 norm, in order to give a broader view of privacy beyond just one attack.
When compared to differential privacy, our methods significantly reduces computational
waste while providing higher privacy.
The contributions of our paper are summarized as follows:
• An effective and novel server-side defense scheme that generates an optimal request
pattern called No Data are Alone (NDA) is proposed
• An effective and novel client-side defense scheme that generates an optimal request
pattern is proposed
• The time complexity of our server-side scheme is compared with the differential
privacy schemes, which hasn’t been shown previously for the differentially private
schemes
• Multiple attack CNNs are created and trained on un-obfuscated data and noised data
and detailed explanations of how they are trained are given
• These CNNs are then used for a thorough evaluation of privacy provided by our
scheme compared to differentially private schemes
• The privacy of both NDA and the differentially private schemes is evaluated using a
distance privacy definition based on the L1 norm, the results show that our scheme
outperforms differential privacy
• A formal privacy definition is defined for our schemes to give a scope of privacy
beyond experimentation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives necessary background
knowledge, then Section 3 lays out the problem description. Section 4 introduces our
proposed scheme NDA in detail, and Section 5 details implementation and experimental
4
methods. Section 6 shows the results of our evaluations on NDA. Section 7 introduces
our Single Cluster solution and details the experimental results from this scheme. Sec-






MPEG-DASH is a ubiquitous standard for video streaming, employed by companies like
Netflix and YouTube. MPEG-DASH begins a streaming session by sending a Media Pre-
sentation Description (MPD) to the client. The MPD is an XML file that outlines the
video segments available for each quality level, along with other characteristics needed for
streaming. The DASH client then parses this file and determines the appropriate quality,
segments to request, and other information. Then it begins streaming using HTTP GET
requests (Sodagar, 2011).
MPEG-DASH uses VBR, an often used means of encoding video streams because of its
efficiency. VBR encodes only as much of a video file as is necessary. Meaning that scenes
in a video have a comparatively higher or lower bit-rate depending on what takes place in
the stream at that point in time. DASH mandates that the video is streamed in segments,
each being requested when a user falls below their buffer threshold. The segment sizes
(bits) are based on video display time. Video display time can be variable sizes or held
constant (Sodagar, 2011), but is most often held constant. Because of variable bit-rate
encoding, each segment contains a different amount of bytes.
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In addition to using VBR and standardized segment sizes with MPEG-DASH, video
streaming is bursty (Rao et al., 2011) because there are periods when new segments are
being requested which cause a spike in bits being sent from server to client, then there are
break periods where no bits are requested. This combination of variable bit-rate segments,
size standardized segments, and bursty segment request patterns led researchers to develop
a successful traffic analysis attack that use this data as a fingerprint. A visualization of a
video’s un-obfuscated bit-rate over time can be seen in Figure 4.1.
2.2 K-Means Overview
K-Means is a popular type of unsupervised learning. The term K-Means comes from (MacQueen
et al., 1967), thought the original algorithm is credited to Steinhaus Hugo (Steinhaus,
1956). The algorithm that is commonly used for the implementation of K-Means today,
and the algorithm used by Sklearn 1 which is the Pyhton package used for experimentation
in this paper, was developed by Stuart Lloyd (Lloyd, 1982). It involves the formation of
clusters in data. Specifically, it involves the formation of any number of clusters, deter-
mined by the number k. This value is set by the user of the algorithm. With a value of
k = 2, two clusters will be created.
At the center of each data cluster is a cluster centroid. This cluster centroid is the mean
of all of the values that belongs to that cluster, which is where the algorithm derives its
name. It will posses k number of means (cluster centroids).
The first step in this algorithm is the initialization of cluster centroids. Initializing a
centroid means giving it a value within the dimensions of the data-set. These cluster cen-
troids can be randomly initialized or use an algorithm such as kmeans++. Once the cluster
centroids are initialized, the Euclidean distance is calculated from each cluster centroid










Once the Euclidean distance is calculated, each data point is assigned to a cluster. This
assignment is based on the Euclidean distance to each cluster centroid. Whichever centroid
is closest to a data point is the centroid that is assigned to. Each data point is assigned to the
cluster centroid that is nearest to it. Once each datapoint has been assigned to its nearest
centriod, the centroids are recalculated as the mean of all the data points in that centroid.
All the data points are then reassigned to the centroids since their positions have changed.
This process is repeated until the cluster centroids no longer change values substantially
when being recalculated.
2.3 K-Means Formal Definition
K-Means is an unsupervised learning algorithm that clusters data points into discrete groups.
Let S be a finite set of vectors, i.e., S = {x1,x2, . . . ,xλ} where xi ∈ Rn is a finite vec-
tor, i.e., xi = (xi1,xi2, . . . ,xin). The algorithm first requires k ∈ N∗ as input, where N∗
is a set of all positive whole numbers excluding 0, and then instantiates a set of clus-
ters C = {C1,C2, . . . ,Ck}. Once C is created, the algorithm instantiates a set of means
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk}, where mi ∈ Rn is initialized randomly or with an algorithm such
as k-means++. For each cluster Ci ∈ C , mi ∈M is considered to be its centroid. After
the initialization of means, each vector xi ∈ S is assigned to a cluster C j ∈ C based on the
minimum euclidean distance between xi and m j. More specifically, for each mean m j ∈M,
the euclidean distance between xi and m j defined by equation 2.2 is computed. Then, xi is
assigned to the cluster C j whose centroid m j is the closest to xi.













































Figure 2.1: A Conceptual Overview of the Proposed Scheme NDA
After the assignment phase, each cluster Ci ∈ C should be a subset of S and given
another cluster C j, with i 6= j, Ci∩C j =∅.








where x(C j)i represents the vector in C j at position i.
The assignment and centroid update process is repeated until the value of each centroid
remain constant.
2.4 Convolutional Neural Network
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are one of the most widely used machine learning algo-
rithms largely because of their ability to learn high level, complex features. Deep neural
networks are machine learning algorithms that operate using a series of layers, the final
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layer being the layer that outputs classification and the first layer being the data that is be-
ing input into the neural network. The layers between the input layer and the classification
layer are known as hidden layers. Each network varies with the amount of hidden layers
it contains. Within each hidden layer are neurons. Each neuron contains an activation
function, which will control whether the neuron ”fires”, to use the common analogy of the
human brain. The input and output of each neuron is controlled by weights. These weight
values are adjusted over time to help the neural network grow more accurate. This happens
by the process of back-propagation, which measures the output of the network against the
real value, and then adjusts weights accordingly.
As a result of their effectiveness, they became a foundation for many variant neu-
ral networks, such as Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM), and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Each of these variants have their
own strengths, for example, RNNs are frequently used in natural language processing. A
Convolutional Neural Network is an augmentation of the Neural Network with a number
of unique components that make it exceptionally good for dealing with multi-dimensional
inputs and data that hold strong spatial correlations, in the case of video streaming, large
bursts of bit data occur at a certain time in the video. CNNs were effectively applied in the
attack scenario put forward by Schuster et al. (?, ?).
CNNs perform multiple transformations to their data that make them unique. One of
these is a convolutional layer, that convolves the data. The output of the convolutional layer
is a dot product computed between a filter and the input. The number of filters and size of
filter can be altered so that the number of channels can increase after a convolutional layer.
The purpose of the convolutional layer is to learn key features in the data such as lines,
edges, textures etc. in the case of image classification.
Another augmentation of a CNN is the pooling layer. The purpose of the pooling layer
is to reduce data dimensionality while preserving key features. Pooling dimensions n× n
are set that are smaller than the input space, a subset of the feature map is then looked
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at through this pooling window of n × n dimensions. The pooling layer then takes only
one value from this window, it can be the average of all the values in the window, or the
maximum etc., but the maximum is the most common value to use. The pooling layer then
outputs the maximum value of this n × n section of the feature map and moves a given
number of spaces. The pooling window can only move one element in the feature map
array or move multiple, the value that controls the amount of elements moved is called the
stride. The pooling layer does not have weights or bias, the only purpose of the pooling
layer is to reduce size while preserving key features, which is why max pooling is more
effective than average pooling, because it will record only the most prominent feature in
each section of the feature map.
Finally, the feature map is flattened to a 1 dimensional vector (this is not required, and
some notable CNN models don’t do this) and there is a fully connected layer before the
classification layer to promote non-linear learning.
2.5 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a technique for privacy protection. It relies on the addition of noise
to data in order to keep individual user data private. The first paper to formally outline
what is know as ε-differential privacy was published in 2006 (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim,
& Smith, 2006). In layman’s terms, a scheme is determined to be differentially private if
an observer cannot distinguish between the presence or absence of one single individual’s
data in the database. Formally, this definition is given by:
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S]≤ exp(ε)×Pr[A(D2) ∈ S] (2.4)
In this formal definition, Pr stands for probability, A represents a differential privacy
analysis mechanism on a database, D1 or D2 represent two databases that differ by only
one data point, and ε represents the metric that controls the amount of privacy.. The lower
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the value of ε, the more noise is added, the more privacy is added. In layman’s terms, we
could say that a system is differentially private if the probability of output in the space S
from mechanism A on D1, when divided by the same value for D2 is less than or equal to




Differential privacy works by adding noise within a range that can be controlled. The
most common way to add noise to a database is to add the noise within a distribution that
is centered on the data-set. The most common distribution for adding noise to a database is
the Laplacian distribution, but the Gaussian distribution can be used as well.
For the purpose of comparison, we implemented two differential privacy mechanisms
in this paper. The two differential privacy mechanisms we implemented were adjusted for
time series data. The two methods we used were d ∗−privacy (Xiao et al., 2015) and
FPAk (Rastogi & Nath, 2010).
2.5.1 Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (FPAk)
FPAk relies on a Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT). For this algorithm, we consider
Q = (Q[1], . . . ,Q[n]) to be a real or complex valued sequence of length n. In our case, it
is a single video’s data. In a DFT, this sequence Q is tranformed into F = (F [1], . . . ,F [n])
where:










F [ j] represents the j-th Fourier coefficient of the DFT(Q). After a DTF is performed
on a data sequence, an inverse DFT (IDFT) can be performed. IDFTs have the prop-
erty IDFT (DFT (Q)) = Q. If we consider a sequence P = (P[1], . . . ,P[n]) with complex
values, then an IDFT will convert this sequence into another complex-valued sequence
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Let Lap(λ) denote a random vareiable drawn from the Laplacian distribution with scale
λ and location µ = 0. Suppose the inputs of the FPAk algirhtnm are Q,λ, and k. The FPAk
algorithm is described as:
• Keep the first k Fourier coeffiecients F [1], . . . ,F [k] after computing DFT(Q).
• Compute F̃ = F [i]+Lap(λ) for i = 1, . . . ,k.
• Return Q̃ = IDFT (PADn([F̃ [1], . . . , F̃ [k]])), where PADn([F̃ [1], . . . , F̃ [k]]) denotes
the sequence of length n obtained by appending n− k zeroes to F̃ [1], . . . , F̃ [k].
Rastogi (Rastogi & Nath, 2010) that FPAk is ε-differentially private for λ=
√
k∆2(Q)/ε,
where ∆2(Q) denotes the L2 sensitivity of a set of Qs. Formally, ∆2(Q) is the smallest num-
ber such that for all Q,Q′ ∈Q, |Q−Q′|2 ≤ ∆2(Q).
2.5.2 d*-privacy
Xiao (Xiao et al., 2015) leveraged d-privacy with a distance metric d∗ on a one-dimensional
time series. Let x and x′ denote two time series. The d∗ was defined as:
d ∗ (x,x′) = ∑
i≤1
|(x[i]− x[i−1])− (x′[i]− x′[i−1])| (2.8)
To achieve d∗-privacy, Xiao (Xiao et al., 2015) extended a mechanism from Chan (Chan,
Shi, & Song, 2011) to implement a d∗-privacy mechanism as follows: Let N donte the nat-
ural numbers and D(i) ∈ N denote the largest power of two that divides i; i.e., D(i) = 2 j
if and only if 2 j|i and 2 j+1 6 |i. Note that i = D(i) if an only if i is a power of two. The
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mechanism A computes a noised value x̃[i] that is used in place of x[i] using the recurrence:
x̃[i] = x̃[G(i)]+(x[i]− x[G(i)])+ ri (2.9)
where x[0] = x̃[0] = 0, and:
G(i) =

0 if i = 1
i/2 if i = D(i)≥ 2











It was proven by Xiao (Xiao et al., 2015) that the algorithm in Equations 2.9,2.10,




3.1 Traffic Analysis Attack
The traffic analysis attack against MPEG-DASH video streaming relies on side channel
information to identify the video a user is streaming. While video streaming, a client re-
quests video segments from the server at regular intervals. The video segments themselves
are encrypted, but the meta-data including packet size and arrival times are visible at the
application layer to any adversary on the network (Schuster et al., 2017). The bit-rate data
seen by the adversary can be used to determine whether or not a user is streaming a spe-
cific video selected by the adversary. Multiple approaches have been taken to use this data
for malicious purposes, both algorithmic and machine learning based. The algorithmic ap-
proaches (Gu et al., 2019; Reed & Klimkowski, 2016) seek to measure similarity between
the users bit-rate data and the adversary’s pre-recorded bit-rate data for a specific video.
The machine learning approaches (Schuster et al., 2017; Dubin et al., 2017) seek to predict
whether or not a user is watching the video selected by the adversary. Schuster et al. intro-
duced a traffic analysis attack based on a CNN and extended it to work in a web browser,
it is executed by JavaScript code that saturates a victim’s connection to a server and then
measures the traffic changes (Schuster et al., 2017). More information about the attacks
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and their implementation is included in Section 8.
However this attack is implemented, whether by machine learning or an algorithmic
approach, the data it relies on is the same. The vital information being leaked is the size
of the packets and the times of their delivery, which allow an adversary to observe the
rate at which bits are sent, or the bit-rate of the video stream. The un-obfuscated graph
in Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation of the format of this bit-rate data. Because of
MPEG-DASH and VBR, these bit-rate patterns are a unique fingerprint for at least 20% of
videos when analyzed theoretically (Schuster et al., 2017), though all implementations of
this attack show accuracy values above 90% for video identification.
For this attack, we make two assumptions. First, we assume a polynomial time adver-
sary, that is, an adversary restricted to practical means of attack. Second, we assume that
the adversary is external, and cannot be executing their attack from the server side.
3.2 Problem Definition
Creating a defense mechanism for this attack is in theory straightforward. The video re-
quest pattern, seen as bit-rate by the adversary, must be changed so that an adversary can
no longer use this information to compromise user privacy. In practice, there are more
considerations, primarily computational efficiency. Video streaming is a computationally
expensive process, and if a request pattern is obfuscated too much it will cause video lag
or video buffering because not enough data is being sent, or conversely, because excess
data is being downloaded. To the best of our knowledge at the time of this writing, only
one defense strategy has been proposed, by Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2019). It leverages
differential privacy and works by setting a proxy between the client and server in the form
of a browser extension. The extension perturbs the video segment request pattern using
differential privacy. Differential privacy adds noise to data, in the case of video streaming,
this noise changes the time intervals of the requests from the client and the amount of data
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requested by the client. The defense scheme proposed by Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2019)
leverages two differential privacy methods for obfuscation, d∗− privacy and FPAk.
While the strategy of video request pattern obfuscation with differential privacy suc-
cessfully defended against the CNN based attack proposed by Schuster et al. (Schuster et
al., 2017), there was computational overhead incurred by the defense because of the use of
differential privacy, which always trades utility for privacy. Because of this, and the need
for scalability in the field of video streaming, we sought to create a more efficient defense
solution.
In our attempt to define constraints for a more efficient, private solution, we considered
that a defensive scheme should improve with more available data, growing more robust over
time. Additionally, we assert that the solution must be scalable, considering the scale of the
video streaming industry, the number of users who stream on computationally constrained
mobile devices, and the computational cost of video streaming.
3.3 Privacy Definition
For our scheme we created a formal privacy definition based on the type of privacy pro-
vided by our scheme. A formal privacy definition gives our scheme scope beyond just the
experimentation done. The privacy of our scheme is given by the mapping of multiple in-
puts to a single output. When we obfuscate a cluster of videos, all the videos in the cluster
are obfuscated to a single output value. This means that if there are 10 videos in a cluster,
if the adversary is only able to observe the streaming after obfuscation, the adversary has
a 10% chance of guessing the identity of the video. If the adversary does guess the title of
the video correctly, they have no way to verify it. Therefore, our privacy definition is based
off of the number of videos in a cluster. The merit of providing privacy in this way is that
as the scale of the scheme increase, the privacy does too. We give our privacy definition as
follows:
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We define n as the total number of videos in the data-set that are clustered, G as the
guess of the adversary, S as an obfuscated video capture, V as the true identity of the
video, Pr[G(S) = V ] is the probability of the correctness of the attacker’s guess, and ε is
a negligible probability. We assume the adversary has full knowledge of the bit-rate of a
single centroid. The probability that the attacker is correctly able to guess the title given by
the centroid can be expressed by:
Pr[G(S) =V ]≤ 1
n
+ ε (3.1)
If multiple clusters are created, then n represents the smallest cluster size, i.e., if there
are 3 clusters, and the smallest cluster has only 5 videos, then n = 5. Though in experimen-
tation the privacy shown is much greater than this.
3.4 Distance Privacy Definition
We sought to create a distance privacy definition to give a more in depth view of the privacy
being provided. Drawing from the attack paper by Schuester et al. (Schuster et al., 2017),
we used the L1 norm as the basis of our privacy definition. The L1 norm can be defined for
two vectors a,b ∈ Rn by the following equation:





For this privacy definition, we consider two vectors x and y. Let the vector x represent
video byte data recorded at a constant interval t = 0.25 seconds over a time space T . Let
y represent the vector x after obfuscation. In the paper by Schuester et al. (Schuster et al.,
2017), the adversary was successfully able to identify a video if the L1 norm between the
recorded data x and the attacker’s fingerprint y was less than 3,500,000 bytes. To make
a robust privacy model, we reduced this threshold to 2,200,000 bytes so that videos must
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have an increased level of privacy, making the scenario more favorable to the attacker.
We also used this privacy definition to compare our proposed scheme NDA to differ-
ential privacy (Zhang et al., 2019). For our own scheme NDA, privacy is two-fold. There
is privacy given by the obfuscation of the original video, and there is privacy given by
belonging to a cluster with a high number of videos. If a cluster has 10 videos, guess-
ing at random the adversary has a 10% chance of guessing the correct video even if the
adversary has full knowledge of which videos are in the cluster. Therefore, for NDA, we
multiply the L1 norm by the number of items in the cluster to account for the extra pri-
vacy provided by being included in a cluster with an increasingly large number of data.
Additionally, this will account for the degradation of privacy that comes when the number
of clusters increases, causing the number of videos per cluster to decrease. Letting C be
a cluster, our scheme’s privacy is shown by (|C| × ‖x− y‖1) ≤ 2,200,000. This privacy
threshold of 2,200,000 bytes is further validated with the accuracy levels shown later in the
experimentation. For differential privacy, we used only the L1 norm as the privacy measure,
represented by ‖x−y‖1≤ 2,200,000, because all the privacy given by differentially private
solutions comes from noise added. It is therefore logical to conclude that a measurement of
the distance between two vectors because of added noise in order to preserve privacy will
give a clear view of the level of privacy provided.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Scheme 1: NDA
4.1 Metrics
For evaluation of the video performance after the implementation of our algorithm, we
used the two metrics defined by Zhang et al.(Zhang et al., 2019), waste and deficit. Both
metrics are defined in relation to the bit-rate pattern of the original video. Deficit can be
defined as the maximum difference between what amount of video is being downloaded in
the obfuscated request pattern, and what amount of video should be downloaded. Waste
can be defined as the opposite, the amount of extra video that is being downloaded that
doesn’t need to be. Let a ∈ Rn be a vector that represents the original un-obfuscated video








4.2 Proposed Scheme Overview
Our proposed scheme, “No Data are Alone (NDA)”, seeks to find an efficient and effective
way to obfuscate video requests from a client. Figure 1 depicts our overall scheme in
detail. In our proposed scheme, the server has a database of all video segment request
patterns from which a random subset will be selected to fit a K-Means algorithm on. Let a
video request pattern be defined as a vector x∈Rn, where x[i] represents one video segment
sent from the server to the client. Let S = (x1, . . . ,xm) be the set of video request patterns.
In our scheme, the server has knowledge of S and its contents. When a client selects a
video for which its request pattern is xi ∈ S, this video request pattern xi is altered by our
algorithm NDA so that its value is now yi.
As a client streams a video, the client will send requests to the server. Each request is
filled with a segment of video that can be defined as xi[ j] from the vector xi. In an unaltered
system, the vector xi is defined progressively by the size of data sent from the server to the
client, with the size of each video request xi (in bytes) being dependent on the content of
the video clip, the desired streaming quality, and the quality of the network the client is
streaming from. Under our proposed scheme, the requests are not filled according to the
request of the client, but according to the vector yi.
In order to preserve video streaming quality, the vector yi is defined by our algorithm
and minimizes the two metrics defined in Section 4.1.
4.3 Proposed NDA Algorithm
Our algorithm is an augmentation of K-Means clustering. We use K-Means clustering
instead of other clustering algorithms because K-Means clustering provides a centroid.
This centroid is the average of all values in the cluster, and is crucial to our scheme. With
another clustering algorithm, we would need to compute the value of the centroid ourselves.
One of the advantages to using K-Means clustering is that initialization is different each
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time the model is fit, and therefore cluster distribution is also different with each fitting.
The implication of this is that even if the attacker knows the full set of videos, and performs
his own clustering, he will not receive the same cluster distributions. So if the adversary
determines that the target video V is in his cluster Cluster 1, this will not necessarily be
true in the defensive schemes cluster distribution.
In our scheme, first, we apply K-Means clustering to the set of videos S. In a naive
approach, the centroid m j of a cluster C j, which is defined as a vector m j = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn)
and is calculated by equation 2.3, can then serve as an obfuscated pattern for each video
xi ∈C j. Theoretically, since there are multiple videos in each cluster, the adversary cannot
distinguish between them if they are all streamed with the same (centroid) pattern. In prac-
tice, the naive approach encounters problems and this theory does not hold (see Figure 6.2).
While clustering data, it is inevitable that some data points x will be alone in a cluster
C. When this is the case, the mean m calculated will be equal to the data point x so that







x(C)i = x (4.3)
where |C|= 1.
In this case, implementation of the naive algorithm would result in the obfuscated pat-
tern yi being equal to xi, and no privacy would be provided. To combat this, we developed
No Data are Alone (NDA).
The assumptions made by our algorithm are as follows: a user will request video seg-
ments (xi1,xi2, . . . ,xin) ∈ xi for some video xi, the server will fulfill these requests with an
obfuscated pattern xi. The server has a database of videos S and an NDA model N that is
fit on a random subset of these videos. Whenever a video xi is requested by the user, the
server must compute yi. This computation is the same as the assignment step in K-Means.
Instead of directly returning this result as yi, our algorithm will check the value of |C j|.
If this value is 1 (meaning the data is alone in a cluster), our algorithm performs a new
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Figure 4.1: Obfuscation Pattern Comparison
assignment.
Our algorithm’s reassignment step is based on the minimization of waste + de f icit
instead of Euclidean distance, and requires |C j| > 1 so that the cluster assignment C j
of a video xi will have not be alone in a cluster, ensuring privacy, and an obfuscated
pattern yi that minimizes waste and deficit when compared to all other cluster patters
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk}. Our algorithm can be represented as follows:

















For Algorithm 1 let M be a list of the cluster centroids, where m j ∈M is the centroid of
a cluster C j. x represent the video segment to be made private, and y is the video segment
after obfuscation. All cluster centroids are evaluated to determine which cluster assignment
C j produces the lowest value of waste + deficit.
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Algorithm 1: No Data Are Alone (NDA)
Input : M, x
1 let min waste = 0
2 let min deficit = 0
3 let y ∈ Rn
4 for each centroid m in M do
let C be the cluster corresponding to m
5 if |C|= 1 then
6 remove m from M
end
end
7 for each centroid m in M do
8 waste = max1≤i≤n{max(m[i]−x[i],0)}
9 de f icit = max1≤i≤n{max(x[i]−m[i],0)}
10 if waste < min waste and de f icit < min de f icit then
11 min waste = waste
12 min de f icit = de f icit




4.4 Cluster Recreation Probability
Our proposed schemes maps multiple inputs to one output. Multiple videos are in any given
cluster, and these videos will all have their patterns obfuscated to the same cluster centroid
pattern. When mapping multiple videos to one centroid, the probability of guessing which
video is mapped to the output is dependent on the number of videos in the cluster. If there
are 10 videos in the cluster, the probability of guessing based off of the output would be
10%. A concern for a scheme that provides privacy in this way is the recreation of the
same mapping. In the case of our scheme, NDA, the adversary would have to produce the
same cluster distribution. In our scheme, we performed clustering on 40 videos (though
this number could greatly increase in real world implementation).
To consider the privacy given my our scheme more fully, we consider the possibility
of the adversary recreating the same cluster distribution used by our defensive scheme.
We give the adversary full knowledge of all 40 videos that were used to perform the NDA
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algorithm. Using this knowledge, the adversary is allowed to perform his own clustering to
attempt to obtain the same distribution as our proposed scheme. A cluster distribution can
be defined as which videos belong to which clusters i.e., there are 4 videos in cluster 1, 12
videos in cluster 2, etc. If the adversary is able to obtain a distribution with the same videos
in the same cluster as the defensive scheme distribution it would be a breach of privacy.
For the cluster initialization algorithm in our scheme, we use K-means++ (Arthur &
Vassilvitskii, 2006). This algorithm will determine the probability of obtaining the same
cluster distribution twice. This algorithm randomly selects a data-point as a starting cluster
centroid, then initializes the rest of the cluster centroids with probabilities proportional
distance from the chosen data-point i.e., a cluster with a distance closer to the chosen
centroid has a lower probability of being chosen as the next centroid, while a data-point the
furthest away from the initial cluster centroid has the highest probability of being chosen.
This means that with K-means++, there are 40 possible initial data-points to choose in our
data-set. This means the adversary has a at most a 140 or 2.5% chance of producing the
same initial cluster centroid. The probability of maintaining the same cluster distribution
degrades with each subsequent assignment. Additionally, the adversary has no way of
knowing if he has successfully produced the same cluster.
4.5 Various Clustering Algorithms
While doing experimentation on K-Means clustering, we also performed clustering with
two other algorithms, Agglomerative clustering and DB-SCAN clustering. Agglomerative
clustering and DB-SCAN are two popular clustering algorithms. When performing cluster-
ing, we noticed the exact same pattern in each of the clustering algorithms. Each algorithm
provided very lopsided clusters, most of the videos were grouped into a single cluster with
only a few videos falling into other clusters. We fit the models multiple times but the result
was always the same. Since the output for all three clustering algorithms was nearly iden-
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tical, we decided to use K-Means clustering. Additionally, our schemes need the cluster
centroid in order to provide privacy. K-Means provides this as part of its implementation,
but it would have to be calculated manually for another clustering algorithm. This would
introduce a small amount of computational overhead because it would have to be imple-
mented manually instead of using a package optimized for it as we did with K-Means, and






Data collection was automated using tshark by Wireshark1 and Selenium2. We collected
data from YouTube, and only videos of 20+ minutes were captured, ad content was filtered
out, and video quality was kept constant (720p). We recorded the server to client bit-rate
of each video in segments of 0.25 seconds. We collected a data-set of 41 different hand
selected videos. The bit-rate data of each these 41 videos was collected for 100 captures
each, and each capture only lasted for exactly 20 minutes. With a 20 minute long capture
that captured data every 0.25 seconds, each video capture had 4800 data-points so that a
single video capture could be represented as xi = (xi1,xi2, . . . ,xi4800). With 100 captures for
41 videos, we ended up with a data-set of 4100 samples, 100 per video, with 4800 data-
points for each video. This data was used to implement our defense algorithm and train our
CNNs. We also collected 1000 traces of 20 minute long videos, each unique. These videos
were split into 10 categories, Boxing, Soccer, Basketball, Football, League of Legends,
Fortnite, Makeup Tutorials, Vlogs, Symphony Performances, and Ted Talks. These videos










































Figure 5.1: An Overview of the Evaluation Methods
5.2 Comparison of Defense Schemes
To evaluate the performance of our scheme NDA compared to the proposed scheme of
Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2019), we implemented d∗− privacy and FPAk exactly the same
as Zhang et al. with one modification. The value for k in the paper by Zhang et al. was
set a 10, and their video length was 720. Our video length was 4800, so accordingly we
increased k to 67.
The un-obfuscated graph in Figure 4.1 is a graph of the data exploited by this attack, bit-
rate over time. The bursty nature of video streaming can be seen here, the graph continues
at a low number of bytes, then a large spike (burst) in the graph occurs when a client’s
request is filled. A graph of our defensive method NDA and graphs of each differential
privacy method are shown to add a deeper analysis of each method, beyond just the waste
and deficit measure in Section 6.
The NDA graph in the bottom right of Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation of the
obfuscation that our proposed scheme creates. Our scheme provides obfuscation by com-
puting an average of many video patterns like the un-obfuscated graph at the top. This
average is the cluster centroid. Because the centroid is the average of multiple videos,
NDA has slightly smaller bursts than the un-obfuscated pattern, but still retains the bursty
nature. In the experimentation from which this graph was derived, 36% of videos were
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assigned to this cluster. In our scheme, the 36% of videos assigned to this cluster will be
obfuscated with the pattern shown in the NDA graph in Figure 4.1.
The FPAk graph in Figure 4.1 is a representation of obfuscation by FPAk, which relies
on a Fast Fourier Transformation, addition of laplacian noise, and subsequent Inverse Fast
Fourier Transformation for its obfuscation. It can be seen that this video doesn’t exhibit the
bursty nature of video streaming, but instead has more gradual fluctuations, which could
lead to video lag because of prolonged periods without requesting new video segments.
The d∗− privacy graph in Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation of d∗− privacy,
which adds simple laplacian noise to time series data. This method adds the most noise,
the range of bytes for the original un-obfuscated video stays mostly within the 50,000-
300,000 range, but the d∗− privacy method has a large number of points in the 1,000,000
bytes range, which would cause an excess downloading of video data. This result agrees
with the waste and deficit measurements given in Section 6.
5.3 Attack Classifiers
To test our proposed algorithm, we implemented the CNN created by Schuster et al. (Schuster
et al., 2017), with a few minor modifications to the architecture. We did this to accommo-
date our data vectors, which were significantly longer than the ones used by Schuster et al.
We used a filter size of 32 with a kernel size of 3 and a pooling size of 2 instead of 6. We
also used the Adadelta optimizer instead of Adam. Additionally, we used z-score normal-
ization and a learning rate of 0.001. These were the only differences. Our classifier has 41
classes, one for each video. We trained this classifier on our full data-set for 80 epochs.
The classifier, ModelA, had an accuracy of 0.9316 and a false positive rate of 0.0017.
For evaluation we used 10 samples for each video, totalling 410 samples for all 41
videos. The results of accuracy, waste, and deficit for all 410 samples tested were aver-
aged to give a broad view of the performance of each algorithm. Figure 5.1 is a visual
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representation of these evaluation methods.
We created three ”attack CNNs” and trained one on noised data from our scheme NDA
and one on noised data from each of the two differential privacy schemes, in an attempt to
increase the performance against them. We then tested these defense schemes against our
attack CNNs and recorded the waste and deficit for NDA, and for the differential privacy
schemes with varying epsilon values. Results of the accuracy for each of these schemes
can be seen in Table 5.1.
To train against our scheme NDA, we used one data-set of videos obfuscated by our
scheme and the original un-obfuscated data-set. Instead of training a new classifier, we
retrained the original model, ModelA. This new attack model, ModelB, was trained for
50 epochs, or else significant over-fitting occurred. This model theoretically shouldn’t be
able to successfully learn to predict our scheme, because of the method our scheme uses to
provide privacy. When we fit our algorithm with 4 clusters, all videos can be obfuscated
to one of four options. This may result in, for example, 15 of 41 videos all being assigned
to the same cluster, and obfuscated with the same pattern. The classifier will be unable to
learn any correlation between an obfuscated pattern and a video class, because so many
videos from different classes will have the same pattern. The results in Section 6 support
this conclusion.
To create the FPAk attack CNN, ModelC, we retrained ModelA on 5 data-sets. We
included the original un-obfuscated data-set, then 4 different data-sets of data obfuscated
by FPAk, two with an epsilon values of 15 and two with epsilon values of 25. Different
epsilon values will yield classifiers robust to different levels of obfuscation. We chose
15 and 25 to have a well balanced model. We trained the model for 500 epochs. This
model required more data and longer training time to become accurate when compared
to the d∗− privacy, which is unsurprising when you consider FPAk in Figure 4.1 and the
higher level obfuscation when compared to d∗− privacy which added significant noise but
retained the bursty pattern. This model had an accuracy of 0.9317 and a false positive rate
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Table 5.1: Comparative Analysis: Attack Classifiers
FPAk d∗−Privacy NDA
Accuracy ε W D Acc ε W D Acc C W D Acc
0 - 10% 0.5 10.45 2.10 0.03 5e-6 29.51 1.68 0.03 4 0.15 2.17 0.07
10 - 20% 5 1.10 2.15 0.16 1.4e-5 10.43 1.42 0.18 N/A N/A N/A N/A
21 - 40% 10 0.57 2.15 0.23 1.8e-5 8.13 1.31 0.33 N/A N/A N/A N/A
40 - 60% 25 0.31 2.16 0.53 2e-5 7.31 1.25 0.44 N/A N/A N/A N/A
> 60% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1e-4 1.49 0.08 0.93 N/A N/A N/A N/A
ε: Epsilon to achieve the accuracy, W : Waste, D: Deficit, Acc: Exact attack accuracy, C: number of clusters
of 0.0024 on the un-obfuscated data.
To create the d∗− privacy attack model, we trained the ModelD from the original model
ModelA with 2 data-sets. We used the original un-obfuscated data and one data-set obfus-
cated by d∗− privacy with an epsilon value of 0.0007. This model trained for only 50
epochs or else over-fitting occurred.
Furthermore, to show that transfer learning was taking place when we retrained ModelA,
we reconstructed the original architecture from ModelA and trained it against FPAk from
scratch on the 5 data-sets, however, the accuracy of this model on the un-obfuscated data
was significantly lower than retraining the previous model, and lower on data obfuscated
by FPAk that is was trained to classify. This implies that the knowledge about identifying
un-obfuscated data successfully transferred from one task (detecting un-obfuscated data) to
another (detecting obfuscated data). From this it can be inferred that even after obfuscation





To get a broader view of the privacy levels shown by our scheme and the extant scheme,
we performed obfuscation on all the videos in our data-set, both with our scheme, NDA,
and with the two differential privacy schemes used by Zhang etal. (Zhang et al., 2019). We
then represented the privacy level of each video with a boolean value, either private or non-
private based on the distance privacy definition given in Section 3.4. We then divided the
total number of non private videos for each scheme by the total number of videos, giving
the percentage of non private videos for each scheme. The results are shown in Table 6.1.
These results can also be interpreted inversely, that is, NDA with 4 clusters has a 1.4%
chance of leaving a video non private, or NDA has a 98.6% chance of successfully priva-
Table 6.1: The percentage of non-private videos created by each scheme
Scheme Privacy
NDA 4 Clusters 0.014
NDA 24 Clusters 0.181
FPAk ε = 0.5 0.00023
FPAk ε = 5 0.971
d∗− privacy ε = 0.000005 0
d∗− privacy ε = 0.0001 0.987
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Figure 6.1: Video Category Distribution Across Multiple Clusters
tizing a video. It can also be seen that the privacy of our scheme degrades some as the
number of clusters increases, but still remains high. It can be seen here that at an epsilon
value of 0.5, FPAk performs well, however, the waste incurred at this value is high (see
Table 5.1). When the epsilon value is increased slightly, the privacy degrades very quickly,
more quickly than the attack accuracy using the CNN (see Table 5.1). This calls into ques-
tion the protection level of this scheme against other attacks. When observing d∗−privacy,
the privacy level looks impressive, but the computational cost of this scheme is very high
(see Table 5.1).
6.2 Clusters and Video Types
Figure 6.1 depicts the clustering of 1000 unique videos, that each fall into one of 10 cat-
egories. The purpose of this figure is to show the distribution of video category among
different clusters. This is important to consider, because it is possible the attacker might
try to determine the cluster identity, and then infer the category of the video from the clus-
ter. This graph gives insight to the possibility of invading a user’s privacy this way. The
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Figure 6.2: Accuracy of the CNN Attack against K-Means and NDA across an increasing
number of clusters
ten categories in the graph fall into 3 broader categories. Sports videos are shown in blue,
video game videos are shown in green, and low action videos are shown in orange. The Y
axis of the graph represents the number of videos in a given cluster, i.e. 40 football videos
fall into Cluster 1, 20 Football videos fall into Cluster 2 etc. This graph shows a broad
distribution of videos even within the same category. League of Legends videos have their
highest percentage of videos in cluster 2, along with Basketball. Fortnite, the other group
of videos in the video game category has the most videos in cluster 2, along with Boxing
videos. From this graph it can be seen that there is no category of videos that dominate a
single cluster.
6.3 Traditional K-Means vs. NDA
Figure 6.2 is a measure of accuracy with an increasingly large number of clusters with
both traditional K-Means and our proposed scheme NDA. This graph displays the need
for an altered K-Means algorithm. As the number of clusters increases, the number of
videos alone in their own cluster also increases. Data points alone in a cluster have no
34
Figure 6.3: Accuracy vs. waste+de f icit
privacy, because the cluster centroid is equal to the video pattern. This is why as the
clusters increase, the number of alone data points increases, and therefore the privacy of
the scheme decreases.
This is because with a high number of videos in one cluster, the centroid is an average
of all these videos. As the number of alone clusters increases, the cluster reassignment
will mean that one video is being assigned another videos pattern, instead of an average
of multiple videos. This makes the similarity to the un-obfuscated video pattern decrease
compared to a centroid that is the average of many videos. However, this impact is minimal,
and the accuracy for NDA never goes higher than 7%.
6.4 Accuracy vs waste+de f icit
Figure 6.3 is a comparison of the the attack accuracy against each scheme vs waste +
de f icit (measured in Mega-Bytes) of each scheme; each defensive scheme was tested
against the classifier trained to attack it. For d∗− privacy and FPAk, we considered multi-
ple ε values. Table 5.1 represents a summary of the performance of each defensive scheme
when evaluated against the CNN that was trained to attack it, i.e. the performance of NDA
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against classifier trained on NDA obfuscated data. Since we could not achieve an identical
accuracy for all three schemes, we set accuracy ranges for the table and found ε-values that
made them fall under the ranges.
As the ε values increase, accuracy increases and waste+ de f icit decrease. This intu-
itive, a higher ε value will add less noise to a differential privacy scheme, in this case, it
means that the obfuscated video is closer to the original and is therefore more likely to
be correctly classified, and will also incur less waste and deficit because it is closer to the
original.
In every ε case, our scheme outperforms differential privacy when considering both
accuracy and waste+ de f icit. Our scheme significantly outperforms d ∗−privacy, and
creates 1MB less waste+ de f icit while having an attack accuracy half as high as FPAk.
The correlation between ε, waste and deficit, and accuracy can also be clearly seen from
this graph. Higher ε values will add less noise, resulting in higher attack accuracy and
less waste and deficit. We did not include the accuracy for d∗− privacy that would’ve
been equivalent to ours because the waste incurred was extremely high, and we wanted to
preserve the scale of the graph (see Table 5.1).
6.5 Attack Accuracy Across Epochs
Figure 6.4 shows the accuracy the attack CNNs of each scheme across multiple epochs of
training. In Figure 6.4, Epoch 0 represents the classification accuracy of ModelA before
training on noised data. Figure 6.4c depicts the accuracy of the classifier that was trained
on both un-obfuscated data and data that was privatized using our algorithm NDA. This
result shows that over 50 epochs, the classifier doesn’t learn anything about about the data,
the accuracy remains below 8% the entire training time. This result is predictable because
of the privacy preserving format of our proposed scheme. With only 4 clusters, all videos
are obfuscated to 1 of 4 patterns. In the testing, 410 samples are taken. All 410 samples
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are obfuscated to only 4 videos. With so many samples being obfuscated into one of only
four possibilities, no learning can occur.
From figure 6.4a, it can be seen that the FPAk attack classifier effectively learned all the
different epsilon values of FPAk except for one, when epsilon is 0.5, which adds consider-
able waste and deficit. The accuracy improvement is expected, because differential privacy
always adds noise within a range (controlled by epsilon), so with enough data a classifier
can still learn to predict accurately through the obfuscation. We used only 4 obfuscated
data-sets to produce this result, but it is logical to conclude accuracy would grow higher
against FPAk if more obfuscated data-sets were used. Additionally, we included one data-
set of un-obfuscated data while training the FPAk attack classifier so that the model did not
over-fit and learn only FPAk.
Figure 6.4b depicts the d∗− privacy attack classifier. The accuracy for this scheme can
also be seen to increase for all but the highest level of privacy protection, which adds too
much waste to be viable.
This is the downside of differential privacy, there is always a trade-off of computational
efficiency and privacy, and a scheme that adds too little noise can be overcome by training
against the differential privacy scheme, but a scheme that adds too much noise can cre-
ate too much computational overhead. Our scheme overcomes this trade-off and provides
constant high level privacy while being computationally efficient.
6.6 Time Complexity
Because of the real world nature of this problem, and the need for a scalability in the video
streaming industry, we examined the computational overhead of both our scheme and the
scheme proposed by Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2019).
Finding an optimal solution to K-Means is NP-Hard (Mahajan, Nimbhorkar, & Varadara-
jan, 2009), therefore, many similar but alternative algorithms have been proposed, the most
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Figure 6.4: Accuracy Across Multiple Epochs For Three Classifiers
commonly used (and used in this paper) is Lloyd’s Algorithm. The time complexity of
Lloyd’s algorithm is O(t×k×n×d) (Hartigan & Wong, 1979) where t is a number of iter-
ations over n points in d dimensions with k number of clusters. The time complexity of our
algorithm is O(k×kz×v), where k is the number of clusters. For each cluster, defined as C j,
the value |C j| must be evaluated, which must be done iteratively. kz is the number of clus-
ters where |C j|> 1 so that the potential waste and deficit of the video V will be evaluated
relative to each centroid. The value v represents the time taken to find the maximum and
minimum values of a data vector so that the difference between x and y can be calculated
Table 6.2: Execution Time (Millisecond) and Complexity
Scheme Time (ms) Time Complexity
NDA 16.1 O(k× kz× v)
NDA w/o




d∗− privacy 155.1 O(λ×n)
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for waste and deficit. Therefore, the time complexity of NDA is O(t×2k×n×d× kz× v).
The lower bound of the time complexity of a Fast Fourier Transformation hasn’t been
proven, but through experimentation, we determined that the slowest component of the
computation of FPAk privacy is the calculation of sensitivity, which is defined as the great-
est difference between any two data vectors in a data-set. Considering all videos x ∈ S one
must find the difference between all videos in a set relative to each other. For example,
the difference between the first video compared to each other video, etc., so the time com-
plexity of this calculation is O(n2). This is an important constraint, because the provable
privacy of differential privacy is contingent on the value for sensitivity (Rastogi & Nath,
2010), so this value cannot be chosen randomly to speed up computation.
The time complexity of d∗− privacy would be O(λ× n), because it performs a se-
ries of constant time computations for the length of one data vector, additionally, during
each iteration it must compute D(i). The time consuming component for our implementa-
tion was the calculation of D(i) which is defined as the largest power of two that divides
a number i (Xiao et al., 2015). We found this value iteratively, trying m numbers until
we found the largest square that divided i, this made out implementation O(n×m), there
are more efficient ways to find that value so it is defined as λ. The implementation of
d∗− privacy was considerably slower than both NDA and FPAk pre-fit algorithms. Both
FPAk and NDA have an impressive computational performance when pre-computation of
a component of each is considered. In the case of NDA, pre-fitting the K-Means algorithm
considerably increased performance, in the case of FPAk, pre-computation of the sensitiv-
ity increases performance considerably. Considering the time complexity of each solution,
without pre-computation, FPAk is not viable, and while d∗− privacy is potentially viable,
the waste added by this scheme can be a problem. Our algorithm will scale better compared
to FPAk if pre-computation isn’t possible, and doesn’t require a list of all videos for pre-
computation, without a full list, FPAKk can’t be proven to be differentially private. Results
obtained through experimentation for the computation of yi from xi both with and without
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pre-computation can be seen in Table 6.2. We recorded the time it took each method to
obfuscated a single video, measuring both pre-computation times and non pre-computed
times for FPAk and NDA.
All the experiments were implemented using Python1 version 3.7 and TensorFlow2
version 2.3. Also, they were executed on a desktop equipped with Intel Core i7-6700
processor at 3.40GHz, 16GB memory, AMD Radeon(TM) R5 340x display adaptor, and





Proposed Scheme 2: A Single Cluster
7.1 Motivation
In order to create a robust scheme, we decided to create a client-side implementation in
addition to the server side implementation. We initially used a server-side implementation
in order to give the computational burden of our scheme to the server, since video streaming
can be a computationally expensive task and we didn’t want to add any additional burden
to the client. Therefore, in order to implement a client-side solution, we had to consider a
more computationally efficient scheme. Additionally, the client-side scheme needed to be
able to be implemented in real time. If a client clicks on a video, the full pattern hasn’t been
streamed yet so it cannot be clustered. The server-side implementation can simply keep a
database of video patterns in order to implement real time, but the client doesn’t have
this amount of storage. Therefore, our goal was to implement a computationally efficient
scheme that can be implemented in real time.
7.2 Proposed Scheme Overview
In this scheme, the client will request video patterns from server, for example, 40 video pat-
terns. The client has the flexibility to request more or less. The average of all these patterns
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1) Request for meta-data from 40
videos
2) Request fulfilled
3) Client creates centroid
using K-Means
Client Server
4) Client requests video segments
based on the obfuscated centroid
pattern
5) Server fulfills obfuscated
requests 
Client Server
Figure 7.1: Proposed Scheme 2
will then be computed, which is equivalent to making a single cluster in K-Means cluster-
ing, therefore our privacy definition applies directly to this scheme. All videos watched
by the client will then be obfuscated with this average. The client is able to request more
videos than will be used for obfuscation, i.e., the client is able to request 100 videos, and
create an average from only 50 of them. This way, the client is able to hide the values in the
average from the server. An overview of our proposed scheme 2 can be seen in Figure 7.1.
7.3 Experimentation
In order to show the effectiveness of our Proposed Scheme 2, we performed two exper-
iments. First, we performed K-Means clustering on our two different data-sets. One K-
Means model was clustered on the 1000 video data-set, and one K-Means cluster was fit
on the 41 video data-set. We performed clustering on these videos with multiple cluster
sizes. For cluster sizes over 1, we performed obfuscation with NDA. We then measured the
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accuracy of videos obfuscated with each of the two models at various cluster sizes. Results
can be seen in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.
We also performed obfuscation of videos in order to show that our Proposed Scheme
2 meets our privacy definition. For this experiment we obfuscated a set number of videos
using Proposed Scheme 2, then tested the accuracy of the CNN against these videos. For
example, we used 10 videos for our Proposed Scheme 2 obfuscation pattern, then tested
the CNN accuracy against only these 10 videos after being obfuscated. According to our
privacy definition, the number of videos used for obfuscation should define the accuracy of
an adversary against our proposed scheme. If 10 videos are obfuscated by a cluster with
only 10 videos, the accuracy against our proposed scheme should be 110 or 10%. Results
from this experiment can be seen in Table 7.3.
7.4 Experimental Results
In Table 7.1 it can be seen that the accuracy of the scheme reduces when the cluster size
increases past 2 clusters. The accuracy after the cluster size of 2 does not hold to our
privacy definition. The same result can be seen in Table 7.2 showing that this trend holds
across data-sets of different sizes.
Table 7.3 represents the clustering of our Proposed Scheme 2. It can be seen in this
table that the accuracy rigorously conform to our privacy definition for every cluster size.
Additionally, the waste and deficit are slightly lower for our Proposed Scheme 2 than for
NDA.
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Table 7.1: Accuracy Across Multiple Cluster Sizes 1000 Video Data-set NDA







Table 7.2: Accuracy Across Multiple Cluster Sizes 41 Video Data-set NDA







Table 7.3: Accuracy Across Multiple Cluster Sizes 41 Video Data-set Proposed Scheme 2











There have been multiple traffic analysis attacks that exploit the MPEG-DASH leak on
video streaming. The most effective attack with the broadest attack surface is by Schuster
et al. (Schuster et al., 2017). The attack can be implemented in the form of a malicious
web advertisement written in JavaScript. Additionally, no closed world assumptions were
imposed on the attack model, the adversary can identify the target video without need for a
predetermined ”set” of videos. The authors’ train a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
for target video identification and achieve high accuracy and precision, with the accuracy
of the accuracy of their YouTube identifier at 99.4% depending on the features selected for
training.
Implementing algorithmic approaches has also been effective at video fingerprint for
identification, Gu et al. (Gu et al., 2019) achieved up to 90% accuracy using a variant of
Dynamic Time Warping. Dynamic Time Warping is an algorithm for comparing time series
data, this algorithm was implemented to determine the similarity between a known video
traffic pattern and an unknown video fingerprint to determine the identity of the unknown
video from a set of possible candidates.
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Instead of dynamic time warping to determine similarity, Reed et al. (Reed & Klimkowski,
2016) used a multi stage algorithm that breaks videos into candidate ”windows” that have
a similar throughput to the target video. After selecting potential candidates, Pearson’s
correlation coefficient is used to determine a ”match” between two video fingerprints. The
model achieved an accuracy of 96%.
Finally, Dubin et al. (Dubin et al., 2017) also used machine learning to great effect, em-
ploying nearest neighbor, nearest neighbor to class algorithm, and support vector machines
and achieved an accuracy above 95%.
In response to these attacks, specifically the CNN based attack, Zhang et al. (Zhang et
al., 2019) used differential privacy as a defense mechanism to obfuscate video bit-rate data.
8.2 Traffic Analysis
A traffic analysis attack is a form of attack in which an adversary learns information by spy-
ing on a victims network traffic. Traffic analysis attacks have a broad set of goals. Some
seek to compromise information about a victims smart home for theft or other malicious
purposes (Copos, Levitt, Bishop, & Rowe, 2016; Kennedy, 2019). Some seek to com-
promise privacy of a victim unsuspecting victim (Taylor, Spolaor, Conti, & Martinovic,
2018; Meidan et al., 2017; Skowron, Janicki, & Mazurczyk, 2020; Li et al., 2016; Feghhi
& Leith, 2016). Some traffic analysis attacks target victims that are using an anonymous
browsing service such as Tor or Pishon (Yang, Gu, Ling, Yin, & Luo, 2017; Ejeta & Kim,
2017; Basyoni, Fetais, Erbad, Mohamed, & Guizani, 2020; Attarian, Abdi, & Hashemi,
2019; Abe & Goto, 2016). Some of these attacks are even able to determine the IP address
of users on Tor (Iacovazzi, Frassinelli, & Elovici, 2019).
Since most web traffic is encrypted these days, most traffic analysis attacks often rely on
side channel information and machine learning to be effective. Some side channel reliant
traffic analysis attacks use only on timing information (Feghhi & Leith, 2016; Ramesh
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& Prakash, 2017; Monaco, 2019) while others depend on different side channel infor-
mation, such as presence or absence of communication information (Baroutis & Younis,
2016), delaying and analyzing HTTP requests (Monaco, 2019), and standard side chan-
nel information, such as packet length, number of packets, time, etc. (Abe & Goto, 2016).
Machine learning allows adversaries to analyze even encrypted traffic to steal user informa-
tion (Msadek, Soua, & Engel, 2019; Kennedy, 2019; Taylor, Spolaor, Conti, & Martinovic,
2017; Kausar, Aljumah, Alzaydi, & Alroba, 2019).
Defending against traffic analysis attacks can be difficult, as noted previously, encryp-
tion is not enough. Some work done seeks to make an efficient defense using Adaptive
Padding (Juarez, Imani, Perry, Diaz, & Wright, 2016). To defend against website finger-
printing, some researchers (Wang & Goldberg, 2017) modify the way browsers commu-
nicate, allowing burst sequences to be molded more easily. Privacy can be added at the
network layer by adding latency (Chen et al., 2018), controlling the network latency to
allow for privacy and utility. Differential privacy also presents a viable solution for obfus-
cating traffic from an adversary. Differential privacy can also be employed (Liu, Zhang, &




This paper aimed to develop a privacy preservation scheme that conformed to rigorous
privacy standards while having a high computational efficiency, overcoming the common
trade-off between privacy and computational speed. Using K-Means clustering as a base,
we created our own algorithm, named No Data Are Alone, that accomplished this goal. Our
algorithm provided privacy at a higher level when measures against the most robust attack
method, which relied on a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). We created multiple
CNNs, each trained on data obfuscated by a different scheme. The attack CNN being
trained on data obfuscated by our scheme never improved in accuracy and was ever able
to reach an accuracy above 7.07%. Other differential privacy defense techniques were
vulnerable to a CNN trained against them, and the CNNs trained against these schemes
had 20% or greater increases in accuracy. Additionally, the computational cost, measured
in waste+de f icit, of our scheme was less than half of the best performing scheme.
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